Despite the significant geopolitical transformations in the South Caucasus and tangible progress achieved in the Azerbaijan-Armenia normalization process, certain political commentators continue to interpret regional developments through selective historical narratives and preconceived political assumptions. Rather than acknowledging Armenia's nearly three-decade occupation of Azerbaijani territories, the suffering of hundreds of thousands of displaced Azerbaijanis, and Azerbaijan's decisive role in reshaping the regional geopolitical landscape, such interpretations frequently question Baku's commitment to peace while overlooking important historical and legal realities. A particularly revealing example is Michael Rubin, Director of Policy Analysis at the Middle East Forum, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and former Pentagon official. In his October 11, 2026, article, Rubin questions Azerbaijan's commitment to peace and minimizes the diplomatic achievements of the August 8, 2025, Washington summit. His subsequent response, published on October 27, introduces further accusations concerning the former conflict, international law, cultural heritage, and historical accountability. However, before addressing these arguments, an important question deserves attention: how did an analyst who once praised Azerbaijan's strategic importance and independence become one of its most persistent critics?
From Azerbaijan's Supporter to Its Persistent Critic
Rubin's earlier assessments of Azerbaijan stand in striking contrast to his current rhetoric. In a February 2013 interview with Region Plus, he described Azerbaijan as an important American partner, criticized Washington for underestimating its strategic significance, and questioned the political motivations of Armenian American activists. He also acknowledged Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories and criticized Armenia's leadership for exploiting nationalism. His assessment was unequivocal: “Azerbaijan deserves better from its relations with the United States.” In his January 2014 paper, Azerbaijan's Iran Problem, Rubin again emphasized Azerbaijan's secular character, strategic importance, and resistance to Iranian interference, describing the protection of its independence as an American strategic priority. Nevertheless, particularly after the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Rubin increasingly adopted positions corresponding to narratives promoted by Armenian lobbying organizations. As documented in the AIR Center's report, Marginalizing the Azerbaijani Perspective, he published ten highly critical opinion pieces in November 2020 alone. Among other arguments, he repeated the historically inaccurate assertion that Stalin had transferred Karabakh to Azerbaijan, advocated opening an American consulate in Khankendi, and urged Israel to reconsider its strategic relationship with Baku.
Rubin's geopolitical advocacy extends beyond the South Caucasus. His writings increasingly reflect positions favorable to India and Greece while adopting a confrontational stance toward Türkiye and Pakistan. In a February 2026 article, he advocated Indian support for the dissolution of Pakistan and Türkiye. Similarly, writing for Kathimerini, he encouraged Greece and Cyprus to leverage American F-16 sales against Ankara. Against this broader background, his changing position on Azerbaijan-United States relations is particularly noteworthy. Having previously advocated stronger American engagement with Baku, Rubin now criticizes the Trump administration's rapprochement with Azerbaijan and questions the TRIPP initiative, raising questions about the consistency of his geopolitical assessments.
Misrepresenting the Azerbaijan-Armenia Peace Process
Rubin's October 11 article reflects a selective interpretation of the former conflict and the ongoing normalization process. He questions the necessity of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), suggesting that Azerbaijan and Türkiye could simply lift their restrictions on Armenia. This argument disregards the circumstances surrounding the closure of regional borders, particularly Armenia's prolonged occupation of Azerbaijani territories and the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis. It also overlooks UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884, adopted in 1993, which demanded the withdrawal of occupying forces from Azerbaijani territories. TRIPP offers an opportunity to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, promote regional economic integration, and strengthen Eurasian connectivity.
Another fundamental weakness concerns Rubin's portrayal of Azerbaijan as the principal obstacle to peace. Such an interpretation overlooks the failure of nearly three decades of negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group and the confrontational policies pursued by Armenia's former leadership. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's 2019 declaration that “Karabakh is Armenia” and former Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan's doctrine of “New War for New Territories” directly undermined prospects for peaceful conflict resolution. These statements, coupled with Armenia's prolonged occupation of Azerbaijani territories, constitute essential elements of the historical and political context preceding the Second Karabakh War and cannot be disregarded in any objective assessment of the former conflict. Despite these developments and Armenia's prolonged occupation, Azerbaijan initiated the post-conflict peace agenda and proposed five basic principles for normalization in 2022. Following bilateral negotiations, the parties agreed on the draft peace agreement in March 2025. The August 8, 2025, Washington summit, hosted by President Donald Trump, resulted in the initialing of the peace agreement and the signing of a Joint Declaration establishing a framework for further normalization. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has translated diplomatic commitments into practical measures by facilitating goods transit to Armenia, initiating petroleum exports, and supporting civil society contacts. These developments demonstrate Azerbaijan's constructive role in advancing regional peace and normalization, which Rubin disregards while speculating about Baku's intentions.
Azerbaijan's position concerning Armenia's Constitution is similarly aimed at preventing future territorial claims and strengthening mutual confidence. The constitutional preamble references Armenia's 1990 Declaration of Independence, which refers to the December 1, 1989, resolution concerning the unification of Armenia with Azerbaijan's former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Constitutional changes have facilitated other peace settlements, including the Prespa Agreement and the Good Friday Agreement, demonstrating that such measures have precedents in international peace processes.
Rubin's Subsequent Allegations: Selective Interpretations of International Law and Historical Facts
Rubin's October 27 response introduces further historical and legal distortions. Notably, AIR Center’s leading advisor Sultan Zahidov’s original letter, submitted under the title “When Narratives Ignore Facts: Rethinking the Azerbaijan-Armenia Peace Process,” appeared on the Middle East Forum website with its opening phrase, “When Narratives Ignore Facts,” omitted by the editors. This alteration was hardly insignificant, since those words encapsulated the central criticism of Rubin's approach: the substitution of selective narratives for historical facts.
Rubin invokes the UN Security Council's endorsement of the OSCE Minsk Group process while disregarding its failure to resolve the conflict over nearly three decades. More importantly, he overlooks the same Council's four resolutions adopted in 1993, which reaffirmed Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and demanded the withdrawal of occupying forces. The Council's support for negotiations cannot be separated from these demands. His references to the supposed “constitutional actions of Nagorno-Karabakh” are equally misleading. The separatist entity, which had no constitutional right to secede unilaterally from Azerbaijan, emerged from the Armenian ultra-nationalist Miatsum movement that sought unification with Armenia. Furthermore, no UN member state, including Armenia itself, recognized the separatist entity as an independent country.
Perhaps the most disturbing element concerns the Khojaly genocide. Rubin invokes statements attributed to former Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutallibov to question the atrocities committed by Armenian occupational forces during the First Karabakh War. Yet Mutallibov himself explicitly rejected this interpretation in February 2020, maintaining that Armenian involvement was evident. More importantly, responsibility for Khojaly does not depend on his statements. The Khojaly genocide has received widespread international recognition, while numerous international institutions and human rights organizations have documented the atrocities committed against Azerbaijani civilians by Armenian armed forces in February 1992.
Finally, Rubin's characterization of Armenian war criminals held in Azerbaijan ignores the legal proceedings against members of the now-dissolved separatist administration. Azerbaijani courts have convicted them on charges including terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious offenses connected with the conflict. These proceedings concern criminal responsibility for acts committed against Azerbaijani civilians and the state, rather than punishment based on Armenian ethnicity. Hence, Rubin's selective treatment of these issues, combined with his reversal on Azerbaijan-United States relations and dismissal of recent diplomatic achievements, raises fundamental questions about the consistency and analytical foundations of his arguments.
