

BULLETIN

HIGHLIGHT OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

Table of contents

- I. **U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's Visit Marks a New Phase in U.S.-
Azerbaijan Relations**
2
- II. **Zangezur Power Line Construction Begins as Azerbaijan Expands
Regional Energy Connectivity**
3
- III. **Azerbaijan Anchors Central Asia's Emerging Connectivity
Network**
5
- IV. **Azerbaijan Extends Gas Exports to Germany and Austria Amid
Europe's Energy Diversification**
7
- V. **Remembering the Victims of the Khojaly Genocide**
9

I. U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's Visit Marks a New Phase in U.S.-Azerbaijan Relations

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's February 9-11 visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan marked Washington's most consequential engagement with the South Caucasus since the August 2025 peace summit in Washington. The trip focused on energy cooperation, artificial intelligence, connectivity infrastructure, and strategic partnership building, signaling a shift from episodic diplomacy toward long-term economic and technological engagement in the region. The visit also carried historical significance. It was the second time a sitting U.S. vice president visited Azerbaijan – after Dick Cheney traveled to Baku in 2008. Occurring six months after the Washington-brokered peace framework between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the trip combined political signaling with the institutionalization of new economic and strategic initiatives across the South Caucasus.

The most significant outcome of the Baku visit was the signing of a Strategic Partnership Charter between the United States and Azerbaijan by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and President Ilham Aliyev. The agreement elevated bilateral relations to a structured strategic level and formalized cooperation across energy transit, digital infrastructure, connectivity, and security.

President Ilham Aliyev described the agreement as opening “an absolutely new phase” in U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. The charter institutionalizes dialogue on regional security, maritime cooperation in the Caspian basin, and defense modernization while expanding cooperation in digital technologies and artificial intelligence.

For Washington, Azerbaijan's geographic position remains central to these initiatives. Situated along the east-west trade routes connecting Central Asia with Europe, the

country plays a key role in the expanding Middle Corridor – also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. During the visit, President Ilham Aliyev emphasized that this corridor could become “a very reliable, safe, and large-scale transportation corridor that will connect Asia with Europe through the territory of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and other neighbors, thus strengthening what has been achieved on the peace track in the region.” Connectivity initiatives are also tied to post-conflict normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Baku has lifted transit restrictions and begun supplying oil products to Armenia, practical steps intended to reinforce economic interdependence following the peace process initiated in 2025.

A major focus of the visit was the development of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a proposed transport corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory. The project is intended to transform what was previously a conflict line into a channel for commerce and regional integration. The TRIPP corridor is also strategically significant for broader Eurasian trade. As part of the Middle Corridor connecting Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus, the route could strengthen east-west connectivity while increasing the region's role in global supply chains.

Vice President Vance, in his remarks, described Azerbaijan as a long-standing but often underappreciated partner of the United States. He pointed to Azerbaijan's military contributions in Afghanistan, where Azerbaijani troops served alongside American forces during the international coalition mission. According to Vance, the visit aimed both to recognize that partnership and to open a new chapter in bilateral cooperation. Vance confirmed that the newly signed Strategic Partnership Charter would formalize cooperation across several sectors, including

economic development, security, and infrastructure. He also announced new initiatives designed to strengthen maritime security, including the planned delivery of boats to support Azerbaijan's ability to protect its territorial waters. The vice president also underscored the importance of the TRIPP corridor, which he described as a project capable of reinforcing the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia through economic cooperation.

Vice President Vance's trip carried significant geopolitical implications for the broader South Caucasus. By strengthening ties with both Armenia and Azerbaijan simultaneously, Washington signaled a pragmatic approach that supports regional normalization while expanding economic and technological cooperation. Rather than relying primarily on military alliances or security guarantees, the United States appears to be embedding itself in the region through infrastructure, nuclear energy cooperation, semiconductor exports, digital connectivity, and strategic economic partnerships. In this emerging framework, connectivity projects, technological integration, and energy infrastructure may become the main drivers shaping the region's long-term development.

II. Zangezur Power Line Construction Begins as Azerbaijan Expands Regional Energy Connectivity

The South Caucasus is entering a new phase of regional energy reconfiguration as Azerbaijan begins construction of a high-voltage power transmission line through the Zangezur corridor, a project designed to connect the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic to the country's unified electricity system and support the development of a broader Azerbaijan-Türkiye-Europe energy corridor.

The project was announced by AzərEnerji, Azerbaijan's national electricity operator,

which confirmed that construction has begun on a double-circuit 330-kilovolt transmission line with a total capacity of 1,000 megawatts. The initial stage includes a 74-kilometer segment stretching from Jabrayil to Agbend and a parallel 105-kilometer section running from Nakhchivan to the Ordubad border. The route follows the Araz River and crosses mountainous and rocky terrain, presenting significant engineering challenges due to difficult relief conditions and harsh climatic factors.

The infrastructure project represents a major step toward eliminating Nakhchivan's long-standing status as an energy island. For decades, the exclave has remained physically separated from Azerbaijan's main electricity grid and has relied on external arrangements for system balancing and frequency regulation. By linking Nakhchivan directly to the country's unified energy system, the new transmission line will enable centralized dispatching, access to reserve capacity, and more stable system management.

At the next stage of the project, an additional 44-kilometer transmission segment will be constructed through the Zangezur corridor itself, linking the Agbend and Ordubad sections into a continuous internal route. At the same time, a new 330-kilovolt substation will be built in the city of Nakhchivan. Preparatory work for this facility has already begun, with 49 hectares of land allocated for the installation and mobilization activities underway.

Beyond its domestic importance, the project forms part of a wider initiative to establish an international electricity corridor linking Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and European markets. As a continuation of this strategy, Azerbaijan plans to construct a 230-kilometer 400-kilovolt transmission line from Nakhchivan to Türkiye. The project will also include the construction of a converter substation operating within the 400-kilovolt voltage class, a technical capability

that has not previously existed in Azerbaijan's energy system.

Once completed, this infrastructure would significantly expand Azerbaijan's cross-border electricity transmission capacity and help align the country's grid with European technical standards. It would also create a new energy route connecting the South Caucasus with European electricity markets and potentially, in the longer term, linking Central Asian renewable energy resources to Europe through the Caspian region.

The launch of construction on the Zangezur transmission line reflects a broader shift in how regional infrastructure projects are being conceived in the post-conflict environment of the South Caucasus. What was initially understood primarily as a transport corridor linking Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan is gradually evolving into a multi-layered connectivity platform encompassing transportation, logistics, and energy infrastructure.

Energy connectivity is emerging as one of the most immediate and practical areas for regional cooperation. For Azerbaijan, the Zangezur transmission line project fits within a broader strategy of expanding its role as a regional energy hub. Azerbaijan already exports oil, natural gas, and electricity to multiple neighboring countries while increasing its presence in European energy markets. President Ilham Aliyev recently noted that Azerbaijan supplies natural gas to sixteen countries, including ten members of the European Union, giving it one of the widest geographical export networks for pipeline gas in the world.

Electricity connectivity through Nakhchivan adds a new dimension to this role by enabling Azerbaijan to function not only as a producer but also as a regional transit and balancing center for electricity flows between the Caspian region, Türkiye, and Europe.

Türkiye has also expressed strong interest in the development of the Zangezur corridor as an energy route. Turkish officials have indicated that in the future Azerbaijani electricity, along with oil, gas, and renewable energy generated in the Caspian region, could transit through the corridor into Türkiye and onward to European markets.

Parallel investments in renewable energy further reinforce this trajectory. Azerbaijan is developing hydropower facilities and large-scale wind projects in its western territories, with the aim of integrating these sources into expanded transmission networks supporting electricity exports. These projects are also expected to connect with the planned Black Sea Energy Corridor linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary.

Earlier this year, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia and Azerbaijan had discussed interconnecting their electricity systems to enable mutual imports and exports. According to Armenian officials, high-voltage transmission infrastructure could be built more quickly and at lower cost than railway connections while generating faster economic returns. Armenian energy experts have suggested that basic grid connectivity between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye could be achieved within roughly a year, although full synchronization of the systems would take longer. Currently, approximately 40 percent of Armenia's electricity generation comes from the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, whose fuel supply and operational structure remain closely tied to Moscow. In addition, significant parts of Armenia's electricity distribution network are controlled by Russian companies. Yet Armenia's energy situation also contains an economic paradox. The country produces roughly as much electricity as it consumes—around seven billion kilowatt-hours annually—and maintains idle generating capacity that cannot be effectively monetized without access to

regional electricity markets. Interconnection with neighboring grids could therefore transform surplus capacity into a potential export opportunity.

The construction of the Zangezur power line represents the emergence of a new regional energy architecture in which electricity transmission, alongside hydrocarbons and transport infrastructure, plays an increasingly central role. As these networks expand, the South Caucasus is gradually shifting from a fragmented energy landscape toward a more integrated regional system shaped by market logic and infrastructure connectivity.

III. Azerbaijan Anchors Central Asia's Emerging Connectivity Network

The growing strategic connection between Central Asia and the South Caucasus was highlighted again in February 2026, when officials from Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia met in Tashkent to discuss expanding cooperation along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor. The discussions took place during a meeting in Tashkent between ADY Chairman Rovshan Rustamov, Chairman of the Board of Uzbekistan Railways Zufar Narzullayev, and Director General of Georgian Railways Lasha Abashidze. During the meeting, the sides reviewed areas of mutual interest and cooperation in the railway sector among the three countries, with particular attention to improving the efficiency of cargo transportation from Central Asia to Europe along the Middle Corridor. Participants also emphasized the importance of expanding the use of digital solutions to increase freight volumes along the route and attract new categories of cargo.

This meeting illustrates a broader transformation underway across Eurasia. Infrastructure connectivity between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe is

increasingly becoming a central feature of regional economic strategy. In February, the European Commission released a comprehensive study outlining the investments required to develop trade routes connecting Europe with Central Asia through the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea. The report emphasized that freight traffic along the Trans-Caspian route has increased sharply since 2022 as companies and governments seek alternatives to routes that pass through Russia. According to the Commission's assessment, trade volumes along the corridor have already multiplied in recent years and could expand significantly further by the end of the decade if infrastructure bottlenecks are addressed. The study identified rail capacity, port infrastructure, and customs coordination as key areas requiring investment in order to transform the corridor into a reliable Eurasian logistics artery.

These European initiatives build on earlier steps taken under the EU's Global Gateway strategy, which aims to expand infrastructure connectivity between Europe and neighboring regions. In January 2026, Brussels and Baku agreed to deepen cooperation on transport and logistics projects linking Europe with Central Asia through the South Caucasus. Among the projects under discussion was a feasibility study for a railway connection linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave, which European officials view as part of a broader network supporting the Trans-Caspian corridor.

The project illustrates how the EU increasingly views the South Caucasus not simply as a neighboring region but as a critical bridge connecting European markets with Central Asia and the wider Eurasian economy. European policymakers have also begun to place greater emphasis on the strategic importance of the Caspian basin for supply chains involving critical raw materials, energy,

and industrial goods. Central Asia possesses significant reserves of minerals such as rare earth elements, tungsten, and other resources essential for advanced manufacturing and energy transition technologies. Improving transport links between Central Asia and Europe is therefore seen in Brussels as a way to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on single transit routes.

These developments highlight a broader transformation underway across Eurasia. The economic relationship between Europe and Central Asia increasingly depends on connectivity corridors that cross the Caspian Sea and pass through the South Caucasus. As a result, Azerbaijan has gradually emerged as a key logistical node linking the two regions. Infrastructure investments in ports, railways, and customs systems along the Trans-Caspian route have strengthened Azerbaijan's role as a transit hub connecting Central Asia with European markets.

This shift in European connectivity policy coincides with growing international engagement with Central Asia. In November 2025, U.S. officials and representatives from the five Central Asian states reaffirmed their commitment to deepen cooperation within the C5+1 framework, which brings together the United States with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The November 2025 summit in Washington marked the second time a sitting U.S. president attended a C5+1 meeting, underscoring the increasing attention the region receives from external partners.

Economic cooperation formed the core of the summit's agenda. The U.S. Department of Commerce announced agreements estimated at approximately \$25 billion across aviation, logistics, critical minerals, and industrial development. Among the projects discussed was a tungsten mining venture in Kazakhstan supported by a non-binding letter of interest from the U.S. Export-Import Bank for up to

\$900 million in potential financing. Preliminary agreements were also reached with American companies for rare earth mining projects in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan announced aircraft purchases from U.S. manufacturers, while Kyrgyzstan explored cooperation in hydropower development, transport infrastructure, and digital technologies.

These initiatives reflect an important evolution in the C5+1 framework. While the format initially functioned largely as a diplomatic dialogue platform, its agenda increasingly prioritizes practical economic cooperation. Transport corridors, supply-chain resilience, and regulatory harmonization have emerged as key areas of focus, reflecting the growing importance of infrastructure connectivity for Central Asia's economic development. Unlike earlier U.S. initiatives in Central Asia, which often struggled to generate lasting economic results, C5+1 now places greater emphasis on implementation. Infrastructure development, regulatory cooperation, and industrial investment are prioritized over political signaling. The significance of this approach lies in its gradual but cumulative impact. Transport corridors, supply chains, and regulatory frameworks tend to evolve incrementally, producing structural changes over time.

Central Asian governments' participation in C5+1 is motivated primarily by economic pragmatism. Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described the initiative as a mechanism to increase economic resilience and expand market access, while Uzbekistan frames its engagement as part of broader economic modernization and diversification efforts. This pragmatic approach reflects a broader diplomatic strategy across Central Asia. Governments in the region generally seek to maintain balanced relations with multiple external partners while pursuing domestic development priorities. The flexibility of the C5+1 format—its project-based orientation

and lack of binding political commitments—allows Central Asian states to cooperate selectively in areas that support national objectives.

In this context, Azerbaijan's expanding engagement with Central Asia has become increasingly important. In November 2025, President Ilham Aliyev joined the seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, marking Azerbaijan's first participation in the format as a full participant. Central Asian leaders emphasized that Azerbaijan's inclusion reflects the growing recognition that Azerbaijan and Central Asia form a shared geo-economic space connected through the Caspian Sea.

Although Azerbaijan is not geographically part of Central Asia in the traditional sense, its role as a logistical bridge between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe has become increasingly evident. The development of the Middle Corridor—linking Central Asian rail networks with Caspian ports, Azerbaijan's transport infrastructure, and onward routes to Türkiye and Europe—places Baku at the center of Eurasian connectivity. Closer coordination between Central Asia and Azerbaijan can diversify transport routes and reduce reliance on traditional northbound and southbound corridors. For landlocked Central Asian economies seeking greater access to global markets, such diversification is becoming an important economic priority. Azerbaijan's growing engagement with Central Asian initiatives reflects the recognition that the region's economic future depends on broader Eurasian connectivity. The expanding role of the Middle Corridor and related connectivity initiatives demonstrates how regional economic geography is being reshaped by new partnerships linking Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Europe.

IV. Azerbaijan Extends Gas Exports to Germany and Austria Amid Europe's Energy Diversification

In early 2026, natural gas from Azerbaijan reached Germany and Austria for the first time via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), extending the reach of the Southern Gas Corridor deeper into Central Europe. The deliveries, confirmed by Azerbaijan's state energy company SOCAR, marked an important milestone in the corridor's expansion and reinforced Azerbaijan's role in Europe's ongoing efforts to diversify energy supplies. At a time when European policymakers continue to reduce reliance on Russian gas, the extension of Azerbaijani exports to new markets highlighted the growing strategic importance of the Caspian region within Europe's evolving energy architecture.

The development reflects a broader trend visible throughout 2025 and early 2026: Azerbaijan is increasingly viewed not only as a stable gas supplier but also as a potential hub for electricity transit and system balancing across multiple regional corridors. Recent developments in the country's energy sector suggest that Baku is gradually positioning itself at the intersection of Europe's natural gas diversification strategy and the continent's longer-term transition toward interconnected renewable electricity markets.

From the European Union's perspective, diversification remains the central pillar of energy security policy. Although the EU remains committed to long-term climate neutrality goals, recent European Commission assessments emphasize that natural gas will continue to play an important stabilizing role during the energy transition, particularly in Southeast and Central Europe where renewable capacity and grid flexibility remain uneven. Within this framework, Azerbaijan's position in the Southern Gas Corridor retains considerable strategic value.

In 2025, Azerbaijan exported approximately 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas, generating roughly \$8.8 billion in revenue. Azerbaijani gas reached 16 countries, including 12 in Europe, reflecting the steadily expanding geographic reach of the country's export infrastructure. Deliveries to the European Union averaged around 13 billion cubic meters annually, reinforcing Azerbaijan's reputation as a reliable supplier at a time when European policymakers continue to prioritize diversified energy imports.

At the same time, Azerbaijani officials have repeatedly indicated that the country possesses the resource base and technical capacity to increase gas deliveries to Europe beyond current levels. However, Baku has emphasized that further expansion depends on long-term demand guarantees from European buyers. Without investment certainty, expanding upstream production and pipeline capacity would be difficult to justify economically.

President Ilham Aliyev raised this issue during the "Azerbaijan Executive Breakfast" at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026. Addressing international investors and policymakers, he noted that European partners often expect Azerbaijan to play a larger role in the continent's energy security while providing limited investment support for either fossil fuel development or renewable energy expansion within Azerbaijan itself.

At the same time, European energy policy discussions increasingly emphasize that long-term energy security will depend not only on diversified gas supplies but also on expanded electricity connectivity and deeper integration of renewable energy markets. Within this emerging framework, Azerbaijan's evolving energy strategy has begun to attract growing attention.

One of the most significant projects illustrating this shift is the Black Sea Submarine Cable

initiative, which aims to connect the electricity systems of the South Caucasus with Southeastern Europe. Developed jointly by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary, the project involves constructing a 1,155-kilometer submarine cable capable of transmitting up to 1,300 megawatts of renewable electricity across the Black Sea. In December 2025 the European Union granted the project "Project of Mutual Interest" status, improving access to financing and regulatory support. If completed according to current plans, the cable could become operational around 2032 and represent the first direct electricity link between the South Caucasus and the European Union.

However, large-scale electricity export routes depend heavily on strong domestic transmission systems and diversified grid connections. European energy assessments emphasize that reinforced national grids and alternative transmission paths are essential to reduce system bottlenecks and improve resilience. In this context, Azerbaijan's ongoing investments in internal electricity infrastructure have broader strategic implications.

Among the most important of these developments is the emerging Zangezur energy corridor in southwestern Azerbaijan. Construction has begun on a high-voltage transmission line designed to integrate the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic into Azerbaijan's unified electricity system and eliminate its long-standing status as an energy island. A subsequent phase of the project envisages the construction of a 400-kilovolt transmission line connecting Nakhchivan with Türkiye, which would align Azerbaijan's electricity grid more closely with European technical standards and strengthen regional power system integration.

Azerbaijan's rapid expansion of renewable energy capacity further reinforces this emerging role. In January 2026, the Khizi-

Absheron Wind Power Plant—the largest wind facility in the South Caucasus—was officially inaugurated. The project represents an important step in Azerbaijan’s efforts to diversify its electricity generation mix and increase the share of renewable energy in its power system.

This development builds upon earlier flagship projects such as the 230-megawatt Garadagh Solar Power Plant, developed in partnership with the UAE-based company Masdar. Since its commissioning, the facility has produced more than one billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and saved over 110 million cubic meters of natural gas by reducing reliance on thermal power generation.

Garadagh remains the largest solar power plant in the Caspian region and across the CIS. Developed with approximately \$262 million in foreign investment, it also marked Azerbaijan’s first industrial-scale solar project implemented through international financing. The expansion of renewable generation allows Azerbaijan to redirect natural gas that would otherwise be used for domestic power generation toward export markets.

Beyond domestic electricity generation, Azerbaijan’s geographic location gives it growing relevance in emerging east–west electricity corridors extending beyond the Black Sea region. European energy assessments increasingly reference proposals for a Trans-Caspian electricity connection that could link Central Asia’s renewable resources with the South Caucasus and eventually with European markets.

In this context, Azerbaijan has signed agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to explore the development of a Central Asia–Azerbaijan green energy corridor. Feasibility studies supported by institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are examining

the potential for transmitting renewable electricity across the Caspian region.

Additional memoranda on renewable electricity trade involving Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye, and Bulgaria indicate gradual progress toward deeper regional electricity market integration. However, translating physical infrastructure into sustained commercial electricity flows will require further regulatory alignment and expanded transmission capacity.

Taken together, recent developments across Azerbaijan’s gas exports, renewable energy expansion, and electricity infrastructure investments suggest that the country’s role in the Eurasian energy system is evolving. Azerbaijan is no longer viewed solely as a hydrocarbon exporter, yet it is not simply emerging as a renewable electricity supplier either. Instead, it increasingly occupies a strategic middle position—combining reliable gas supply, growing renewable generation, and expanding electricity connectivity across multiple corridors linking the Caspian region, the South Caucasus, and Europe.

V. Remembering the Victims of the Khojaly Genocide

In February 1992, one of the most tragic events in the modern history of Azerbaijan took place in the town of Khojaly during the armed conflict in Karabakh. Armenian armed forces launched an assault on the town that resulted in mass violence against the civilian population, including killings, injuries, and hostage-taking. Geographically, Khojaly occupied a strategically significant location near Khankendi. During the early stages of the conflict, the town gained increased logistical and military importance because it hosted the region’s only airport at the time. Control over this infrastructure made Khojaly a key objective for military operations. Beginning in the autumn of 1991, the town was effectively

under blockade, and by January 1992 electricity supplies had been cut off. Civilians remained inside the besieged settlement. These conditions placed the population in an extremely vulnerable position and intensified the humanitarian consequences once the assault began.

According to reports produced by international observers who conducted fact-finding missions in the conflict zone in March and April 1992, the attack on Khojaly began late in the evening of February 25 with heavy artillery shelling. Infantry units entered the town during the early hours of February 26, between approximately 1:00 and 4:00 a.m., and the final pockets of resistance were suppressed by around 7:00 a.m. During the assault, Armenian forces, supported by the former Soviet Union's 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment stationed in nearby Khankendi, carried out mass atrocities against Azerbaijani civilians.

Official Azerbaijani statistics state that 613 civilians were killed during the events, including 106 women, 63 children, and 70 elderly persons. In addition, 487 people were wounded, 1,275 were taken hostage. Many of those captured were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment, and the fate of 150 of the hostages remains unknown. The human cost of the massacre was devastating. Eight families were completely annihilated. Twenty-five children lost both of their parents, while 130 children lost one parent. The tragedy left deep and lasting scars on the Azerbaijani nation and became one of the darkest pages in the history of the conflict.

The events in Khojaly were not as an isolated wartime episode but as part of a broader policy of ethnic hatred and violence against Azerbaijanis during the occupation of Azerbaijani territories. Attacks on Azerbaijani civilians in settlements such as Baghanis Ayrim,

Jamilli, Karkijahan, Meshali, Malibeyli, Garadaghly, Tugh, and Selaketin are further evidence of the systematic nature of this violence.

The Khojaly genocide constitutes a gross violation of international law and fundamental humanitarian norms. The crimes committed in Khojaly fall under the provisions of key international instruments, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Statements by former Armenian officials, including former defense minister and president Serzh Sargsyan, show that the massacre formed part of a deliberate policy during the conflict.

More than three decades later, the memory of Khojaly remains deeply embedded in the national consciousness of Azerbaijan. Each year the country honors the victims of the genocide and calls for international recognition of the tragedy and accountability for those responsible. Today, as life gradually returns to the territories liberated from occupation, reconstruction and resettlement efforts are underway, including in Khojaly itself. Yet the events of February 1992 remain an enduring symbol of the suffering endured by Azerbaijani civilians during the conflict.