



CENTER FOR ANALYSIS
OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND
MULTICULTURALISM

ANALYSIS

Beyond Transport: The Emerging Energy Dimension of the C6 Framework

Roza Bayramli

Malika Mansurova

📍 Mirza İbrahimov 8, Baku, AZ1005, Azerbaijan

📞 (+994 12) 596-82-39, (+994 12) 596-82-41

🌐 E-mail: www.aircenter.az, info@aircenter.az

SEPTEMBER 2026

Beyond Transport: The Emerging Energy Dimension of the C6 Framework

Executive Summary

While transport connectivity has been the principal practical area underpinning the emerging C6 format, energy cooperation – encompassing both traditional hydrocarbons and renewable energy – is emerging as a second dimension of regional cooperation.

Traditional energy cooperation among C6 participants is already taking shape through concrete bilateral projects. The SOCAR-operated North Ustyurt PSA in Uzbekistan, joined by BP in 2026, illustrates how cooperation between Azerbaijan and Central Asian states can attract major international investment and potentially contribute to a broader C6 energy agenda.

Green energy cooperation, centered on the Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan Green Corridor Alliance and the developing Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor, could eventually connect Central Asia’s renewable-energy potential with European markets. Its potential linkage with the separate Black Sea Submarine Cable between Georgia and Romania could further strengthen this westward energy architecture and create opportunities for broader cooperation within the C6 framework.

Introduction

The emerging C6 format, which unites Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian states, builds on the increasing transport connectivity that has connected the two sides of the Caspian and can strengthen this process through more extensive regional coordination. Azerbaijan's role as a major Eurasian transit hub has been reinforced by the Baku International Sea Trade Port at Alat and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, while cargo transport through Azerbaijan along the Middle Corridor increased by 90% over three years. By providing an additional rail link from China to Uzbekistan, the developing China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway could further strengthen east–west connectivity by feeding into westward routes toward the Caspian and Azerbaijan¹. Cooperation among C6 participants has also begun to expand into other areas as regional connectivity has deepened. One of the most promising areas is energy cooperation, which includes both conventional hydrocarbons and renewable energy. This implies that the evolving C6 agenda may eventually go

¹ Ilham Aliyev addressed 7th Consultative Meeting of Heads of State of Central Asia. (2025, November 16). President.az. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/70592>

beyond transport and offer a more comprehensive framework for regional economic and energy cooperation.

The Political and Institutional Prerequisites

Azerbaijan's entry into the Consultative Meetings of Heads of State of Central Asia as a full participant on November 16, 2025, marked a significant political turning point in the development of the C6 format. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev characterized this development as a "historic event." Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared that Central Asia and Azerbaijan "today form a single geopolitical and geo-economic region"². The Treaty on Allied Relations, signed in Tashkent on August 23, 2024³ and subsequently ratified by Uzbekistan in May 2025⁴, formally elevated bilateral relations to the level of an alliance and provided a stronger legal and institutional foundation for further cooperation.

This bilateral framework has been further strengthened by President Ilham Aliyev's recent state visit to Uzbekistan on 23–24 August 2026⁵. During the visit, the two presidents signed the Treaty on Eternal Friendship and held the third meeting of the Supreme Interstate Council⁶. The two sides also adopted a program aimed at increasing bilateral trade turnover to USD 1 billion by 2030 and a practical action plan on investment and trade. Energy was identified among the key areas of the bilateral agenda, alongside transport, industrial cooperation, geology, and other sectors⁷. These developments demonstrate that the strong political alignment between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan is increasingly being complemented by sector-specific implementation in areas such as energy, transport, investment, industry, and trade.

Traditional Energy Cooperation

The energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan has already expanded into tangible projects. The State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), Uzbekneftegaz, and Uzbekistan's Ministry of Energy signed a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) on July 24, 2025. The agreement pertains to the exploration and potential hydrocarbon production of six blocks in the North Ustyurt region: Boyterak, Terengquduq, Birqori, Kharoy, Qoraqalpoq, and Qulboy. The project is estimated to

² Ibid.

³ Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan signed documents. (2024, August 23). President.az. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/66727>

⁴ Bayramli, R. (2026, June 1). Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan partnership gains momentum. Jamestown. <https://jamestown.org/azerbaijan-uzbekistan-partnership-gains-momentum/>

⁵ Ceremony for signing and exchanging Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan documents held in Tashkent. (2026, August 23). <https://president.az/en/articles/view/73327>. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/73327>

⁶ Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan deepen alliance with \$1bn trade target and stronger Trans-Caspian links. (2026, August 23). Euronews. <https://www.euronews.com/2026/08/23/uzbekistan-and-azerbaijan-deepen-alliance-with-1bn-trade-target-and-stronger-trans-caspian>

⁷ Presidents of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan delivered press statements » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. (2026, August 23). President.az. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/73330/print>

require an investment of approximately \$2 billion⁸. SOCAR will serve as the operator and conduct seismic surveys covering more than 3,000 linear kilometers⁹.

The project structure underwent a substantial transformation less than one year later. BP acquired a 40% participating interest on May 13, 2026, while SOCAR and Uzbekneftegaz each maintained a 30% stake¹⁰. This was especially significant because it represented BP's initial foray into the upstream sector of Uzbekistan. Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov, the Minister of Energy of Uzbekistan, characterized the development as evidence of international investors' confidence in the energy sector reforms of the country¹¹.

The project has since progressed to the exploration and implementation stages. Uzbekneftegaz proposed in June 2026 that drilling in the North Ustyurt blocks commence by the end of 2027¹². SOCAR subsequently reported the completion of seismic field operations in July 2026¹³, with seismic-data processing expected to continue into the first quarter of 2027¹⁴. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan's energy presence in Uzbekistan is expanding beyond upstream activities. SOCAR initiated the development of a network of filling stations and announced its entry into the retail fuel market of Uzbekistan in August 2026¹⁵. Combined, these developments suggest that the energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan is gradually broadening throughout the energy value chain, from exploration and potential production to downstream activities.

BP's involvement in the project also contributes a significant international dimension by providing the project with additional capital, expertise, and commercial credibility. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan's increasing capacity to directly engage in the development of Central Asian energy resources is illustrated by SOCAR's role as operator. Despite the fact that the North Ustyurt PSA is a bilateral Azerbaijan–

⁸ Azerbaijan's State Oil Company to open representative office in Uzbekistan. (2026, May 13).

Interfax. <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/117554/>

⁹ Uzbekistan negotiating to involve BP in Ustyurt PSA being implemented with SOCAR. (2025, November 6). Report.

<https://report.az/en/energy/uzbekistan-negotiating-to-involve-bp-in-ustyurt-psa-being-implemented-with-socar>

¹⁰ BP buys 40% stake in Uzbekistan oil and gas blocks. (2026, May 13). Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/bp-buys-40-stake-uzbekistan-oil-gas-blocks-2026-05-13/>

¹¹ Online Service Group. (2026, May 14). BP enters Uzbekistan upstream sector with 40% stake in North Ustyurt PSA. Daryo. <https://daryo.uz/en/2026/05/14/bp-joins-north-ustyurt-oil-and-gas-project-in-uzbekistan-with-40-stake/>

¹² Uzbekneftegaz proposes to start drilling at Ustyurt project with SOCAR, BP by end of 2027. (2026, June 2). Interfax. <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/117879/>

¹³ SOCAR: Seismic field operations on Ustyurt project have been completed – EXCLUSIVE - BakuInform. (2026, July 21). SOCAR: Seismic Field Operations on Ustyurt Project Have Been Completed – EXCLUSIVE - BakuInform.

<https://www.bakuinform.az/en/news/socar-pridaetsia-osoboe-znachenie-podgotovke-kadrov-dlia-neftegazovoi-promyslennosti-i-cifrovoi-transformacii-s-uzbekistanom-ekskluziv>

¹⁴ SOCAR announces completion timeline for Ustyurt seismic data processing – EXCLUSIVE. (2026, July 17). AZERTAC.

<https://azertag.az/en/xeber/socar-announces-completion-timeline-for-ustyurt-seismic-data-processing-esclusive-4325393>

¹⁵ Online Service Group. (2026, August 24). SOCAR to enter Uzbekistan's retail fuel market with filling station network. Daryo. <https://daryo.uz/en/2026/08/24/socar-to-enter-uzbekistan-retail-fuel-market-with-filling-station-network/>

Uzbekistan project rather than a C6-wide initiative, it serves as a valuable example of how cooperation among C6 participants can attract major international companies and evolve into comprehensive regional energy partnerships. In this sense, the project can be viewed as one of the building blocks that could support a broader C6 energy agenda in the future.

The Green Energy Partnership: Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan

Traditional energy is not the sole focus of energy cooperation among the C6 countries. A trilateral framework for renewable energy cooperation is currently being developed by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The Agreement on Strategic Partnership in the Development and Transmission of Green Energy was signed by the presidents of the three states at COP29 in Baku on November 13, 2024¹⁶. The Accelerated Partnership for Renewable Energy in Central Asia (APRECA) was established by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) two days later¹⁷. The initiative aims to enhance regional and inter-regional connectivity, attract investment, and expedite the deployment of renewable energy to facilitate trade in renewable energy.

Subsequently, this trilateral collaboration acquired an institutional framework. On December 27, 2024, the three national transmission operators – Azerenergy, KEGOC, and Uzbekistan’s National Electric Grid – signed a founding agreement to establish the Green Corridor Alliance Joint Venture¹⁸. On July 2, 2025, the company was officially registered in Baku, with the three transmission operators serving as its founding shareholders¹⁹. The Alliance is intended to support the development of renewable energy projects and advance work on the proposed Central Asia–Azerbaijan green energy corridor, including the preparation of the necessary feasibility studies for the transmission of renewable electricity toward European markets.

International financial institutions also assisted the initiative. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the energy ministries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on April 5, 2025, to provide support for the feasibility study of the

¹⁶ Baku hosted trilateral meeting between Presidents of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. (2024, November 13). President.az. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/67297/print>

¹⁷ IRENA and Azerbaijan Unveil Renewable Energy Partnership for Central Asia at COP29. (2024, November 15). IRENA. <https://www.irena.org/News/pressreleases/2024/Nov/IRENA-and-Azerbaijan-Unveil-Renewable-Energy-Partnership-for-Central-Asia-at-COP29>

¹⁸ Green Corridor Alliance Joint Venture was established between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan | Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan. (2024, December 27). Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan. https://minenergy.gov.az/en/xeberler-arxivi/00445_9301

¹⁹ Joint Venture “Green Corridor Alliance” registered in Baku to promote green energy development in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. (2025, July 2). Press Releases | KEGOC. <https://www.kegoc.kz/en/press-center/press-releases/166789/>

Caspian Green Energy Corridor²⁰. The memorandum established a high-level framework for cooperation, with a particular emphasis on the development of the institutional and legal conditions required for cross-border electricity trade. The initiative is a component of the project's regional technical assistance provided by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

In 2026, the project's technical preparation made further progress. The Italian engineering and consultancy company CESI was appointed by ADB to conduct Phase 1 of the feasibility study, which was formally launched in January 2026. The study is investigating the technical, economic, regulatory, and environmental feasibility of the proposed interconnection between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as its potential to enable the transmission of renewable electricity from Central Asia to European markets²¹.

The project also acquired a stronger legal and institutional foundation in 2026. Following Kazakhstan's ratification of the trilateral Agreement on Strategic Partnership in the Development and Transmission of Green Energy on April 27, 2026, representatives of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan met in Tashkent in May to review the status of the Green Corridor Alliance and discuss the next stages of implementation²². More recently, Kazakhstan initiated discussions with the European Commission on the possible inclusion of the Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor among the EU's Projects of Mutual Interest, seeking greater European institutional recognition for the initiative²³. Taken together, these developments indicate that the trilateral project is gradually moving from political commitment toward a more structured legal, institutional, and technical framework.

The potential for expanded collaboration within the C6 framework is also generated by the advancements made within the trilateral partnership. This possibility was given further political significance during the informal meeting of the Heads of State of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries in Cholpon-Ata on July 31, 2026²⁴. The discussions covered regional priorities including trade and transport connectivity,

²⁰ ADB (2025, April 5). ADB Signs MOU with AIIB, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to Support Feasibility Study for Caspian Green Energy Corridor. Asian Development Bank. <https://www.adb.org/news/adb-signs-mou-aiib-azerbaijan-kazakhstan-and-uzbekistan-support-feasibility-study-caspian-green-energy>

²¹ CESI. (2026, February 16). CESI to lead Feasibility Study for Caspian Green Energy Corridor. <https://www.cesi.it/news/2026/cesi-to-lead-feasibility-study-for-caspian-green-energy-corridor/>

²² KEGOC took part in discussions on the new phase of the Green Corridor Alliance project. (2026, May 18). Press Releases | KEGOC. <https://www.kegoc.kz/en/press-center/press-releases/168318/>

²³ Kazakhstan seeks EU support to include Trans-Caspian Energy Corridor in PMI list. (2026, August 26). Report. <https://report.az/en/energy/kazakhstan-seeks-eu-support-to-include-trans-caspian-energy-corridor-in-pmi-list>

²⁴ Informal Meeting of Heads of State of Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries held in Cholpon-Ata (2026, July 31). Prezident.az. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/73167/print>

energy, industry, digitalization, investment, and sustainable development ²⁵ . Azerbaijan's participation as a full member of the Consultative Meeting format therefore provides a broader political setting in which existing bilateral and trilateral energy initiatives could gradually be linked to the wider regional agenda.

Linking the Trans-Caspian and Black Sea Green Energy Corridors

The Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor's strategic importance is further emphasized when viewed alongside the separate Black Sea Submarine Cable project. The planned approximately 1,155-kilometer high-voltage direct current (HVDC) interconnector is intended to link the electricity systems of Georgia and Romania across the Black Sea, with commercial operation currently expected in 2032²⁶. The two projects could eventually serve as complementary components of a broader westward electricity transmission architecture, rather than a single continuous cable from Central Asia to Europe.

In this scenario, the renewable electricity produced in Central Asia could be transmitted across the Caspian to Azerbaijan and subsequently through Georgia. The Black Sea Submarine Cable would then establish a direct connection to Romania, from which electricity could be transmitted to additional European markets via the existing and planned continental grid infrastructure. This includes Hungary and potentially other Central and Southern European markets.

The strategic relevance of these connectivity projects is also bolstered by the broader European policy environment. The European Union unveiled a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package for Central Asia at the inaugural EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand in April 2025. This package encompasses transport connectivity, critical raw materials, water and energy, and digital connectivity²⁷. Although this package is not specifically focused on the Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor or the Black Sea Submarine Cable, it is indicative of the EU's broader dedication to enhancing sustainable connectivity between Central Asia and Europe.

The development of these projects could further solidify Azerbaijan's status as a critical transit and energy link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and European markets. Renewable electricity generated in Central Asia could be

²⁵ Leaders of Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan call for stronger regional cooperation. (2026, August 1). Xinhua. <https://english.news.cn/20260801/9f635e5e2de34781921f89e25d45374f/c.html>

²⁶ Argus Media. (2026, January 21). Q&A: Black Sea power line set for 2032 operation: GSE. Latest Market News. <https://www.argusmedia.com/pt/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2778448-q-a-black-sea-power-line-set-for-2032-operation-gse>

²⁷ Joint press release following the first EU-Central Asia summit. (2025, April 4). Council of the EU. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/04/joint-press-release-following-the-first-eu-central-asia-summit/pdf/>

transmitted westward through Azerbaijan and Georgia and connected to European electricity markets if the planned interconnections are successfully executed.

Renewable Energy Potential of C6 Countries

Because the participating countries have renewable energy resources that are highly complementary, there is significant potential for the expansion of energy cooperation to the broader C6 level. Uzbekistan has experienced substantial growth in its solar and wind energy capacities. In 2026, 15 solar photovoltaic plants and five wind power plants were operating in Uzbekistan, with a combined installed capacity of 5,582 MW²⁸. The government intends to elevate the proportion of renewable energy in the total electricity generation to 54% by 2030 as part of the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy²⁹.

Azerbaijan also possesses substantial renewable-energy resources. Currently, renewable sources comprise approximately 20.8% of the total installed generating capacity, while the country's technical renewable-energy potential is estimated to be 135 GW onshore and 157 GW offshore, as per the Ministry of Energy³⁰. The country's climate target is also advanced by Azerbaijan's NDC 3.0, which was submitted to the UNFCCC in 2025. The document aims to achieve a 40% reduction in net greenhouse-gas emissions by 2035 compared with 1990 levels, subject to specific financial, technological, capacity-building, and other conditions³¹.

Kazakhstan also boasts a substantial renewable energy sector that is rapidly expanding, as well as significant wind and solar potential. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared in 2026 that renewable energy sources were already generating over 7% of Kazakhstan's electricity and were anticipated to surpass 15% by 2030³².

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan continue to prioritize hydropower. In 2024, hydropower generated approximately 88% of the country's electricity, as reported by the National

²⁸ 2026-yil boshidan buyon quyosh va shamol elektr stansiyalari tomonidan ishlab chiqarilgan elektr energiyasi hajmi 1 mlrd kVt-soatga yetdi. (2026, February 13). O'zbekiston Respublikasi Energetika Vazirligi.

<https://gov.uz/oz/minenergy/news/view/131931>

²⁹ В настоящее время в Центре стратегии развития проходит пресс-конференция на тему «Переход к “зелёной” экономике, расширение транспортно-логистических сетей и развитие туризма». (2026, January 16). Министерство Энергетики Республики Узбекистан. <https://gov.uz/ru/minenergy/news/view/149175>

³⁰ The use of renewable energy sources in Azerbaijan | Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan. (2026, July 29). Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan. <https://minenergy.gov.az/en/alternativ-ve-berpa-olunan-enerji/azerbaycanda-berpa-olunan-enerji-menbelerinden-istifade>

³¹ Azerbaijan's Nationally Determined Contribution 3.0. (2025). In UNFCCC. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2026-08/NDC%203.0%20Report_Azerbaijan_UPD.pdf

³² GOV.KZ - Единая платформа интернет-ресурсов государственных органов (ЕПИР ГО). (2026, April 22). <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa-ljubljana/press/news/details/1206579>

Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic³³. Tajikistan's hydroelectric profile is particularly robust, as hydropower accounts for over 95% of electricity generation³⁴.

Turkmenistan is also in the process of integrating renewable generation into its energy system, which is primarily based on hydrocarbons. The government reported in April 2026 that the country's first 10 MW hybrid solar-wind power plant in Gyzylarbat etrap of Balkan velayat had been prepared for commissioning³⁵.

These diverse resource profiles collectively establish a degree of complementarity throughout the C6 region. Uzbekistan is experiencing rapid growth in solar and wind capacity, while Azerbaijan has a substantial solar potential and particularly large offshore wind resources. Kazakhstan has a substantial wind and solar potential, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan contribute a robust hydropower base. Turkmenistan is currently in the process of developing its solar and wind resources. This complementarity has the potential to enhance seasonal balancing, facilitate cross-border electricity exchange, and solidify the economic justification for broader regional energy cooperation within the C6 framework if it is bolstered by more robust interconnections and compatible regulatory frameworks.

Challenges and Prospects for Expansion

Despite the positive momentum, several obstacles continue to limit the development of a broader C6 energy architecture. Several key projects remain at the feasibility or preparatory stage. Phase 1 of the feasibility study for the Central Asia–Azerbaijan Green Energy Corridor is expected to be completed by January 2027³⁶, while commercial operation of the Black Sea Submarine Cable is currently expected to begin in 2032³⁷. Simultaneously, these initiatives will necessitate substantial infrastructure investment, cross-border regulatory coordination, and compatible frameworks for electricity trade in order to function as a cohesive regional system. Incorporating environmental considerations, such as the influence of submarine

³³ Производство и распределение электроэнергии в 2024 году - Статистика Кыргызстана. (2025, October 3). Национальный Статистический Комитет Кыргызской Республики. <https://stat.gov.kg/ru/news/proizvodstvo-i-raspredelenie-elektroenergii-v-2024-godu/>

³⁴ Производство и потребление – Министерство энергетики и водных ресурсов Республики Таджикистан. (n.d.). МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЭНЕРГЕТИКИ И ВОДНЫХ РЕСУРСОВ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ТАДЖИКИСТАН. https://www.mewr.tj/?page_id=563

³⁵ China is Turkmenistan's priority partner in implementing high-tech renewable energy projects. (2026, April 30). <https://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/en/post/105816/china-turkmenistans-priority-partner-implementing-high-tech-renewable-energy-projects>

³⁶ Mamadaminov: First phase of Caspian energy corridor feasibility study to be completed in January 2027 - EXCLUSIVE. (2026, June 17). Report. <https://report.az/en/energy/mamadaminov-first-phase-of-caspian-energy-corridor-feasibility-study-to-be-completed-in-january-2027-exclusive>

³⁷ Argus Media. (2026, January 21). Q&A: Black Sea power line set for 2032 operation: GSE. Latest Market News. <https://www.argusmedia.com/pt/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2778448-q-a-black-sea-power-line-set-for-2032-operation-gse>

infrastructure on the Caspian and Black Sea ecosystems, into project planning will also be necessary.

However, institutional and technical mechanisms are already being implemented to mitigate some of these limitations. The corridor's development is gradually incorporating technical preparation, financing mechanisms, and international institutional support, as evidenced by the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's participation in the project framework, Kazakhstan's engagement with the European Commission regarding potential Project of Mutual Interest status, and CESI's work on the feasibility study.

The expansion of energy cooperation beyond Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan remains largely prospective. At present, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are not participants in the trilateral Green Corridor Alliance, and no concrete mechanism has been established for their integration into the project. Nevertheless, their renewable-energy profiles offer the potential for a more extensive collaboration in the long term. In Turkmenistan's case, the deepening of bilateral energy relations with Azerbaijan provides an additional basis for potential future cooperation. During President Serdar Berdimuhamedov's state visit to Azerbaijan on June 22–23, 2026, the two countries signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Energy, providing an additional bilateral framework for deeper energy cooperation³⁸.

External partners are also becoming increasingly important to the development of regional green-energy cooperation. Institutional, technical, and potential financial support is provided by the EU, ADB, and AIIB for energy-transition and connectivity initiatives. Saudi Arabia has also become directly involved in regional renewable-energy cooperation. In November 2024, Saudi Arabia signed a joint executive program with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan at COP29³⁹. The program is designed to evaluate regional electricity interconnection projects, identify joint investment opportunities, and promote the development of renewable energy⁴⁰. This broader network of external partnerships reinforces the climate-diplomacy aspect of C6-related energy cooperation and situates emerging regional connectivity projects within the broader Eurasian green-transition agenda.

³⁸ Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan documents exchanged. (2026, June 22). <https://president.az/en/articles/view/72787>

³⁹ Documents on expanding green energy partnership signed with Saudi Arabia | Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan. (2024, November 13). Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan. <https://minenergy.gov.az/en/xeberler-arxivi/00398>

⁴⁰ Saudi Arabia signs joint executive program with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to enhance cooperation in renewable energy development and transmission on the sidelines of COP29. (2024, November 13). The Saudi Press Agency (SPA). <https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2207226>

Conclusion

Energy cooperation is gradually emerging as a potential second dimension of the C6 framework alongside transport connectivity. Existing bilateral and trilateral initiatives – from the Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan North Ustyurt project to the Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan Green Corridor Alliance – demonstrate that cooperation among C6 participants is already expanding beyond transport, even though a common six-country energy architecture has not yet been established. The prospective linkage of the Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor with the Black Sea Submarine Cable could further strengthen this trend by creating a westward electricity-transmission route connecting Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and European markets.

Azerbaijan's status as a trans-Caspian energy and connectivity hub linking Central Asia with the South Caucasus and European markets could be further enhanced by these developments. Closer energy cooperation could generate additional opportunities for export diversification, cross-border electricity exchange, and investment in renewable generation for the Central Asian states. Whether these bilateral and trilateral initiatives ultimately evolve into a genuine C6 energy architecture will be contingent upon the construction of physical interconnections, regulatory coordination, financing, and the willingness of all six participants to integrate energy more systematically into the regional agenda.

Authors:

Roza Bayramli, Senior advisor at the Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism

Malika Mansurova, MA Student in Diplomacy and International Affairs at ADA University