Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of the South Caucasus, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were offered by Russia and the West (i.e. the European Union and the United States) two alternative integration platforms: On the one hand, the Russia-led regional integration projects, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), on the other hand, the Euro-Atlantic integration, namely the European Union and NATO. Over the years, the three countries made their choices in this context: While Georgia opted for the Euro-Atlantic integration, Armenia aligned with Russia within the CSTO and EAEU. Azerbaijan, upholding a balancing approach in foreign policy, decided to proceed with neutrality by keeping equidistance and pursuing friendly and mutually beneficial relations with both Russia and the West. The Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 put an end to the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories by the former and opened up opportunities for the regional cooperation in the South Caucasus. This was a new momentum for the region which lacked any intraregional interaction or cooperation amongst all three countries in the post-Soviet period. This situation brought about two more integration projects which could include all the three countries of the region: trilateral cooperation platform of the three South Caucasian republics and the 3+3 regional cooperation platform which included Russia, Iran, and Türkiye along with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

Unlike the above-mentioned two integration platforms of Russia and the West, Azerbaijan expressed interest in the two newcomer platforms. While the prime ministers of the three South Caucasian republics for the first time came together and hold discussions about regional cooperation during an international forum in Tbilisi in October 2023, there has not been yet any tangible move in the direction of integration in this trilateral format. However, there have been some steps taken to materialize regional cooperation within the 3+3 format. The meeting of the foreign ministers of the participating countries in the 3+3 format (without Georgia’s participation) in October 2023 in Tehran voiced optimism concerning the future of this grouping (Mid.ru, October 24, 2023). According to some observers, including this author, this promised a potential to signify transition to a new security order in the South Caucasus where Azerbaijan is seeking to balance Russia and Iran with the participation of Türkiye and gain more autonomy in regional geopolitics (Huseynov, 2023). From the Azerbaijani perspective, this endeavor is articulated as an effort to assert influence by maintaining Russia at a distance, precluding Iran’s encroachment, and fostering a measured involvement of the West in the South Caucasus’s geopolitical space. Nevertheless, the developments since the October 2023 meeting of the 3+3 group have introduced challenges to the realization of this envisioned security paradigm. Armenia’s gradual shift towards closer ties with the West amidst strained relations with Russia, coupled with Georgia’s consistent refusal to join any regional geopolitical project that includes Russia, underscores the propensity away from the integration amongst the countries of the region. This situation, which is perceived by Azerbaijani side as the emergence of geopolitical fault lines, further complicates regional dynamics (Trend.az, April 5, 2024). Amidst these uncertainties, the feasibility of materializing the 3+3 framework is being decreased, although it remains as an option on the table.

In light of these developments, Azerbaijan confronts an increasingly precarious position, as it navigates the challenges posed to its traditional foreign policy balancing act by the intensifying geopolitical confrontation in the region which forces the regional countries to make a clear choice between competing power centers. Driven by a desire to eschew an unequivocal alignment with either major power bloc, Baku endeavors to chart a nuanced course which is hoped to secure the viability of Azerbaijan’s non-alignment. In this milieu, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) emerges as a practical alternative for Azerbaijan. President Ilham Aliyev’s unequivocal endorsement of the OTS during his inauguration speech on February 14, 2024, underscores Azerbaijan’s commitment to integration within the Turkic world, reaffirming Baku’s refusal to participate in the Western- or Russia-led integration initiatives (President.az, February 14, 2024). In this context, the OTS represents a pragmatic avenue for Azerbaijan to fortify regional cooperation and defense collaboration, underlining its commitment to fostering regional stability amidst geopolitical flux.

This paper is aimed to analyze the rationale behind Azerbaijan’s balanced approach in foreign policy and its persistent refusal to join the Western or Russian blocs. The paper discusses the viability of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as an alternative regionalism for Azerbaijan. It argues that the emergence of the OTS as a regional power center is in the interests of the West as well, given the fact that this Turkic union emerges as a counterbalancing actor in the South Caucasus and Central Asia vis-à-vis surrounding great power and promotes the resilience of the member states.

Azerbaijan’s Balanced Approach in Foreign Policy

Azerbaijan is pursuing a policy of non-alignment in international relations, although unlike, for example, Moldova, its constitution does not prohibit joining military alliances. Since 2011, Azerbaijan has been a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an international movement uniting 120 member and 17 observer countries. Based on the understanding of non-participation in military blocs, the NAM was formally established by 25 states, including India, Egypt, and the former Yugoslavia, at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. Azerbaijan chaired the NAM from 2019 to 2024 and actively promoted the goals and principles of the movement in international relations. Based on these principles, the government of Azerbaijan used to characterize its policy of non-alignment as an imperative conditioned by its geographical location. According to Hikmet Hajiyev, Azerbaijani presidential aide on foreign policy, the geopolitical realities of the region urge Baku to pursue a multi-vectoral foreign policy course and develop close relations with various regional and global players (Atlantic Council, June 11, 2019).

In upholding these principles, Azerbaijan seeks to avoid allying with one geopolitical pole at the expense of the country’s relations with other actors. A quick overview of Azerbaijan’s foreign policies in recent years supports this inference. For example, in June 2021, Azerbaijan signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations with its major ally Türkiye. The countries vowed to militarily support each other if either side is attacked by another state or group of states (President.az, June 15, 2021). In February 2022, Azerbaijan signed another declaration with Russia in Moscow (Mfa.gov.az, February 22, 2022) – a move that was interpreted by some Azerbaijani experts largely as a move for reassurance that Russia will not “pursue similar policies toward Azerbaijan [as Russia has carried out against Georgia and Ukraine] in exchange for Azerbaijan recognizing Russia as a dominant power in the broader former Soviet region” (Huseynov, 2022). However, this declaration does not bear the same legal status for Baku as the one signed with Ankara, which has been ratified by the parliaments of both states. Such a positioning is critical for a number of reasons, but primarily because of the lack of any capable balancing power that would dare to openly and militarily confront Russia in the case of a challenging security situation that might involve Azerbaijan. This cautious approach is related, among other factors, to the fact that Azerbaijan-Russia relations have had problematic phases, both historically and over recent years. Russia’s traditional support to Armenia in the former Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Moscow’s military supplies to Yerevan prior to and during the Second Karabakh War, and the deployment of Russian troops as peacekeepers in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan after this war constitute the rationale for Baku’s vigilance in its Russia policies.

Azerbaijan continued to uphold this approach in the wake of the withdrawal of the peacekeeping contingent from the Karabakh region in April 2024. This development was indeed unexpected and unprecedented as it was the first time that Russian armed units left the territory of a post-Soviet state voluntarily and prematurely. Many analysts in the region contemplated the reasons behind this move and raise questions about how the two countries (Russia and Azerbaijan) agreed on this (Jam-news.net, April 18, 2024). For some observers, Moscow would not have withdrawn from the region in such a peaceful manner, if there was not a win-win deal for the Kremlin. Therefore, many analysts pointed to the possibility of Azerbaijan’s membership to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) which is critically important for Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions. However, President Aliyev, on 23 April, made it clear that Baku has no such plans at the moment, though did not rule out this possibility in the future, if the membership promises any economic benefits to Azerbaijan (President.az, April 23, 2024). However, this and other comments about the European Union were probably the polite rejection of any alignment with global geopolitical powers, whether it is West or East. Azerbaijan has earlier singled out any plans or intentions to join the European Union or the NATO (TASS, December 6, 2023). This has been a clear departure from Azerbaijan’s plans to pursue “integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures” which was clearly outlined as a “main direction of national security policy” under the National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, adopted in 2007 and not updated since then (Ethz.ch, undated). President Ilham Aliyev has clearly articulated it in 2004: Our current strategic choice is integration in Europe, European family and institutions. We are strongly committed to this policy. We will do our utmost so that Azerbaijan meets all standards and criteria peculiar to Europe. Our policy is such and we have been pursuing it for a long time. Current events in Azerbaijan are the results of this continued policy. For Azerbaijan, the lessons drawn from Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and the developments between Russia and Ukraine since 2013 were considerable. The tragic experience of Ukraine that came on the heels of the country’s abandonment of neutrality and the launch of efforts to accede to the EU and NATO demonstrated the failure of the West to protect the regional countries against the threats that the Euro-Atlantic choice bring about. Baku read this as the reaffirmation of the importance of the balanced approach in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.

That said, Baku has not abandoned the relations with the West. Quite contrary, Azerbaijan has become a major player in the European energy security as well as in the Europe-Asia connectivity along the Middle Corridor. Today Azerbaijan is negotiating with its European partners about the possibility of increasing natural gas exports to the EU and thus help the efforts of member states to mitigate the risk of dependence on single sources and supply routes (Caspiannews.com, June 4, 2022). The two sides have forged a strategic partnership in the field of energy that is pivotal for both sides economic prosperity and energy security. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, called Azerbaijan a “reliable partner” of the EU, when she signed the deal on the strategic partnership with President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, on July 18, 2022 (Ec.europa.eu, July 18, 2022). This partnership, as highlighted by the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) Advisory Council and the 2nd Green Energy Advisory Council which took place in Baku, Azerbaijan on March 1–2, 2024, is founded on tangible achievements and shared goals, particularly in the realm of energy cooperation. Faced with increased Russian violence and a continued unjustified war on our doorstep, it is increasingly clear that, for Europe, there will be no return to business as usual in its energy relations with Russia. That space is now filled by other trusted and reliable energy partners. And we found exactly that in Azerbaijan, said Kadri Simson, the EU Energy Commissioner, during her speech at the inaugural session of the Advisory Council, which was attended by the representatives of 23 countries in Baku (Ec.europa.eu, March 1, 2024).

Azerbaijan has been also a close partner of the NATO in its operations in Kosova and Afghanistan. This was commended by Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of the NATO, in his visit to Baku on March 17–18. We appreciate very much your contribution to our KFOR mission in Kosovo, but also, of course, your presidency and your contributions to our mission in Afghanistan over many years were extremely important. You are absolutely right, one of the last troops to leave Afghanistan were actually Azerbaijani troops. Because you were responsible for the protection of the airport, which was a key task in the evacuation of the NATO presence in Afghanistan, said Stoltenberg in his press conference with the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (President.az, March 17, 2024). This is a clear manifestation of Azerbaijan’s balanced approach in foreign policy and Baku’s keen interest to maintain friendly relations with all power centers within the interests of the country. Located in the highly precarious geography neighboring Russia in the North and Iran in the South, Azerbaijan is compelled to cautiously consider geopolitical realities and balance of power in the region. The regional situation is, however, growing more tense and confrontational which creates immense pressure on Azerbaijan’s cautious balancing and non-alignment. For instance, on November 15, 2023, during a hearing before the United States Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the future of Karabakh, James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, made a statement that stirred significant concern in Azerbaijan. While addressing the Armenia-Azerbaijan disputes and developments in the South Caucasus, he asserted: A future that is built around the access of Russia and Iran as the main participants in the security of the region, the South Caucasus, is unstable and undesirable including both for the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. They have the opportunity to make a different decision now (YouTube Channel of House Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans, November 15, 2023). This statement came in the wake of a series of developments indicating a shift towards a new security order in the South Caucasus, including the October 2023 ministerial meeting in the 3+3 framework. This was followed with another foreign policy move of the West towards the South Caucasus which stirred concerns in Baku. On April 5, 2024, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Antony Blinken, Secretary of State of the United States, in a trilateral format in Brussels (US Department of State, April 5, 2024). According to the sides, the meeting was aimed to increase Armenia’s resilience in economic sphere. This meeting was largely interpreted in the region as a significant milestone in Armenia’s foreign policy, underscoring its efforts to depart from Russia’s and a shift towards seeking security support from Western nations – although the publicly known results of the meeting seemed to be insignificant. Given the highly sensitive geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus and the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, this meeting was closely followed in Baku (Huseynov, 2024). Above all, Baku expressed concerns that the meeting, that excluded Azerbaijan, would create geopolitical divisions in the South Caucasus threatening regional peace and security. This was presented as the extension of the geopolitical rivalries between Russia and the West into the South Caucasus which poses huge security risks to all the neighborhood. On the other hand, the Armenian premier’s shift towards the West at the cost of his country’s relations with Russia creates expectations in the Western capitals for a similar move from the Azerbaijani government or support to the actions of the Armenian leader. On the contrary, Azerbaijan seeks to maintain its traditional balanced approach in foreign policy and develop friendly relations with all major powers. In this context, the deepening and intensifying integration within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) emerges as an alternative regionalism for Azerbaijan which is also instrumental for Baku to maintain its balanced positioning between Russia and the West.

The Emergence of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as an Alternative Regionalism

On February 14, 2024, during his inauguration speech at parliament, the reelected President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, outlined the country’s foreign policy priorities within the framework of regional integration projects (President.az, February 14, 2024). He designated the Organization of the Turkic States (OTS) as the primary focus for his new term, dismissing alternative organizations without explicitly naming them (Azertag.az, February 14, 2024). “This is the main international organization for us because it is our family. We have no other family. Our family is the Turkic world,” he stated about the OTS, which includes Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (only recognized by Türkiye) as observer states. This stance serves as a message directed towards both Euro-Atlantic military and political structures and Russia-led integration projects, indicating that Baku has no intention of aligning with either. The OTS grants Baku significant potential to counterbalance other regional powers, assuming a more important role in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Similarly, the institution holds considerable importance for other member states amid escalating geopolitical tensions. Consequently, member states are moving toward deeper integration in various spheres, albeit cautiously, mindful of potential repercussions from Russia and China. Over the past year, the OTS made significant strides towards institutionalization in areas such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, the Turkic Judicial Training Network, the Union of Notaries of the Turkic World, the Turkic Investment Fund, and the Organization of Trade Unions of Turkic States (Turkicstates.org, November 3, 2023). One central area for integration within the OTS is the development of allied relations among the member states and deeper military ties. The final communiqué from the latest summit of the OTS in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 3, 2023, called for “closer cooperation in the field of defense industry and military collaboration” (Turkicstates.org, November 3, 2023). Member states implement joint projects in the economy, culture, connectivity, energy, and other areas. They pursue cooperation in military and security spheres, however, in a primarily bilateral format. One of the most recent significant developments in this direction occurred on February 28 when Kazakhstan’s Parliament ratified the Treaty on Allied Relations with Uzbekistan, signed in Tashkent on December 22, 2022 (Trend.az, February 28, 2024). The Treaty, already ratified in Uzbekistan last year, upgrades bilateral relations between the two countries to a new level of collaboration (Apa.az, December 1, 2023). It also prohibits them from joining any blocs or unions and engaging in any measures directed against the other party. The treaty resembles the Shusha Declaration between Azerbaijan and Türkiye but, unlike this declaration, it falls short of committing the signing parties to support each other in the case of an attack by a state or group of states.

Azerbaijan is a staunch supporter of defense cooperation within the OTS. Wars and bloody conflicts break out. In this case, first of all, the main guarantor of security becomes the defense potential. I believe that cooperation between the member states in areas such as security, defense, and the defense industry should be further increased, Aliyev said at the summit in Astana in November 2023 (Anadolu Agency, November 3, 2023). The member states have taken significant steps in this direction, albeit mainly bilaterally, which may be followed by more multilateral initiatives. As one analyst noted about this trend within the OTS: Once non-security collective and multilateral cooperation has begun to seem ‘normal’ for the current generation of national leaders and publics in the region, the evolutionary path to greater military and security cooperation will become normalized as well (Outzen, 2023).

In May 2022, Kazakhstan and Türkiye, as part of the newly established “enhanced strategic partnership,” agreed on a deal for the production of Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in Kazakhstan, making it the first country outside Türkiye to produce Turkish drones (Astana Times, February 21). In October last year, it was announced that the production of the UAVs in Kazakhstan will start in 2024 (Caliber.az, October 15, 2023). “We set a goal not just to open production, but to transfer experience and technology so that in the future Kazakhstan can independently produce unmanned aerial vehicles,” Turkish Aerospace representative Erol Oguz said about the production in the Central Asian republic (Caliber.az, October 15, 2023). Turkish defense industry companies ASELSAN and ROKETSAN operate in Azerbaijan and plan to expand their activities. Reportedly, Azerbaijan is already producing one of the spare parts for the newly inaugurated Turkish fighter jet KAAN (Apa.az, March 1, 2024). Similar to other OTS members, Azerbaijan has various Turkish drones in its fleet. Baku recently introduced the Turkish UAV Akinci drones into service. Türkiye’s combat drones were critical for the OTS members Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan in their conflicts with Armenia and Tajikistan, respectively. In late 2023, Uzbekistan became the last Turkic state in Central Asia to acquire Turkish drones. The expansion of defense cooperation within the OTS signifies a pivotal shift in regional dynamics, with member states increasingly prioritizing mutual security and strategic alignment. Aliyev’s reaffirmation of Azerbaijan’s commitment to the OTS underscores the organization’s central role in shaping the foreign policy agenda of its member states. Furthermore, the integration of Turkish defense industry companies in member states’ defense infrastructure underscores the tangible benefits of cooperation within the OTS framework. From joint production ventures to the deployment of cuttingedge Turkish UAVs in regional conflicts, the OTS is emerging as a formidable force in the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. However, challenges remain in navigating the delicate balance between deepening military cooperation and managing relations with external actors such as Russia and China. As member states continue to pursue deeper integration, they must remain vigilant against potential backlash from regional powers. Nevertheless, the trajectory is clear: the OTS is poised to play an increasingly influential role in shaping the security architecture of the Turkic world.

Conclusion

In forging its path amidst the swirling waves of regional geopolitics, Azerbaijan decided to embrace the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as a cornerstone of its foreign policy strategy. This choice reflects not only a distancing attempt from Western- or Russia-led integration initiatives but also a reaffirmation of Azerbaijan’s preference to cooperate with all power centers in the pursuit of the country’s national interests. The decision to eschew the Russia-led blocs and Euro-Atlantic integration in favor of the OTS stems from a deeply ingrained understanding of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical realities and historical experiences. The scars of past conflicts and the specter of regional instability loom large in Azerbaijan’s strategic calculus, driving the nation to seek alternatives that offer both security and autonomy. In this context, the OTS emerges as an alternative regionalism which allows Baku to deepen trade and cooperation in various fields with neighboring countries without becoming part of the wider geopolitical rivalries. Moreover, the OTS offers Azerbaijan a pragmatic avenue to bolster its security and defense capabilities, free from the constraints and entanglements of Western- or Russia-led alliances. The burgeoning defense cooperation within the OTS, exemplified by joint production ventures and military collaboration, underscores the organization’s potential to serve as a bulwark against external threats and destabilizing forces.

In the final analysis, the integration within the Turkic World and, importantly, with a leading role of a NATO member – Türkiye – is an opportunity that is aligned with the interests of the United States and the European Union in Eurasia. This is reflected in the fact that the OTS bolsters the independence and resilience of the member states and empowers them vis-à-vis the expansionist policies of other power centers. The rise of the OTS as a formidable player in regional geopolitics would, therefore, make a critical adjustment to the balance of power in the larger Eurasia. The peace and prosperity in this region – which is the geographic center of Eurasia and therefore at the spotlight of great power struggles – would be benefited from the rise of the OTS as a self-standing geopolitical agent.

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