The “security dilemma” is one of the key concepts in the academic study of international relations and foreign policy. First articulated by John Hertz in 1950 and subsequently analyzed in detail by scholars such as Robert Jervis, Charles Glaeser, and others, the security dilemma describes how actions taken by one state to enhance its security—building up its weapons, putting its military on alert, forming new alliances—tend to reduce the security of other states and cause them to respond in kind. The result is an ever-increasing spiral of hostility that leaves no side better off than before (15).
The issue of the “security dilemma” has long been considered a root cause of rising distrust and insecurity in various parts of the world, including the South Caucasus region. Despite windows of opportunity for peace that emerged after the Second Karabakh War, the existence of certain obstacles to the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, coupled with growing militarization, diminishes optimism regarding the establishment of a robust security architecture in the region.
In a recent interview with the local media channels, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev expressed concerns about the emerging conflict risks stemming from Armenia’s ongoing military buildup. He stated that the continuous armament of Armenia posed a significant threat to the security of the South Caucasus and due to the extensive militarization, a significant portion of Azerbaijan’s state budget would be allocated to military and security matters. According to the state budget of Azerbaijan for 2025, while 4 billion manats (USD 2.4 billion) will be allocated for the restoration of de-occupied regions of Azerbaijan, a substantial 8.4 billion manats (USD 4.9 billion) will be directed towards bolstering military and security capabilities. President Aliyev emphasized that this significant expenditure was a direct consequence of Armenia’s arms race, forcing Azerbaijan to divert resources from other crucial sectors. He furthermore added that France and other countries supplying weapons to Armenia must immediately terminate and cancel these contracts (1).
Yerevan’s commitment to active militarization is evident in its steadily increasing defense budget and expanding defense partnerships with countries like India, France, and Greece. Allegations also point to possible military cooperation with Iran, potentially valued at $500 million (11). Armenia’s defense spending has seen a significant rise, from approximately $600 million in 2021 to $1.37 billion in 2024 (8). On October 28, during the budget discussions in Parliament, Armenian Minister of Finance, Vahe Hovhannisyan announced that Armenia’s draft state budget for 2025 includes an allocation of 664.7 billion drams (over $1.7 billion) for defense spending which is a 20% increase from the defense allocations in 2024 (9).
Based on recently signed military contracts, one can conclude that India has emerged as a significant arms supplier to Armenia. Various assessments indicate that the total value of Armenian military purchases from India has reached approximately $2 billion. These acquisitions include advanced weaponry systems such as Kalyani Marg 155-BR self-propelled howitzers, Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems, Akash anti-aircraft systems, anti-tank rockets, and ammunition. (5,16,21). Furthermore, a significant development in bilateral defense relations occurred in 2023 and 2024 with the establishment of military attaché positions between Armenia and India. This marked a crucial step towards institutionalizing military-to-military cooperation, fostering enhanced communication and coordination between the two nations. The exchange of military representatives signifies a deepening of defense ties between the two countries, facilitating closer collaboration and information sharing (17, 18).
France stands out as another major player that Armenia has resorted to for diversification of its military suppliers. Unlike India, France has been more actively engaged in the processes in the South Caucasus, driven by a combination of geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Prior to the 2020 Second Karabakh War, France served as a mediator alongside Russia and the United States, ostensibly striving for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. However, France’s support for Armenia became increasingly biased after 2020, which undermined the principle of neutrality expected from a mediating party.
The post-2020 war period witnessed a significant shift in the regional power dynamics within the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s successful military campaign resulted in the reassertion of control over previously occupied territories. This altered status quo presented a potential opportunity for a durable peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, France’s continued support for Armenia, particularly through the provision of advanced weaponry, can be perceived as counterproductive to these peace efforts.
The recent signing of three military cooperation agreements between France and Armenia, including the transfer of Bastion anti-ship missile systems, Ground Master 200 radars, and Mistral air defense systems, has raised serious concerns in Azerbaijan regarding Armenia’s intentions. These arms transfers not only exacerbate regional tensions but also directly contradict calls for de-escalation and undermine ongoing efforts to achieve a lasting peace. (12, 19, 20). During Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan’s visit to Paris in June 2024, France and Armenia signed a contract for the purchase of 36 Caesar self-propelled 155-millimeter, 52-caliber cannon howitzers. These advanced artillery systems have a range exceeding 50 kilometers with specialized projectiles. Delivery of the howitzers is scheduled to occur over the next 15 months. French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu described this agreement as a “new important milestone” in Paris’s defense relationship with Yerevan (6). Furthermore, recent reports suggest that Armenia is on the path of purchasing the Trajan 155mm towed artillery gun system, jointly developed by India and France (7).
As a culmination of their military partnership in December 2024, Armenia and France signed a defense cooperation program following strategic defense consultations held at the Armenian Ministry of Defense. The program includes several dozens of measures in practically all domains of the activities of the armed forces (14).
In addition, the European Union and the United States are seeking to enhance military and security cooperation with Armenia, possibly aiming to assist Yerevan in diversifying its security partnerships and reducing its dependence on Russia. However, this one-sided support for Armenia might negatively impact regional peace processes by increasing uncertainty about Yerevan’s true intentions. On July 22, 2024, the European Council adopted the first ever assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia worth €10 million. According to the official website of the Council the aim of this assistance measure is to enhance the logistical capacities of the Armenian Armed Forces, and to contribute to improved protection of civilians in crises and emergencies (10).
Regarding the Armenia-USA defense partnership, it’s noteworthy to emphasize that in May 2024, the USA announced plans to deploy a military consultant to the Armenian Defense Ministry. This move aimed to enhance the compatibility of the Armenian army with the American armed forces and reduce its reliance on the Russian model of military development (22). Furthermore, both states jointly conducted “Eagle Partner” peacekeeping training exercises in Armenia during September 2023 and July 2024 (23, 24).
On January 14, 2025, Secretary of the State Anthony Blinken and Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan signed a Strategic Partnership Commission Charter, signifying an elevation of their bilateral relationship (3). Section III of the document focuses on military and defense issues. It outlines Armenia and the United States’ intention to expand defense and security cooperation programs. This includes establishing bilateral defense consultations within the next year and providing professional military assistance training to the Armenian military (2). While the document does not explicitly address arms sales to Armenia, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan recently stated in an interview that Armenia was interested in acquiring American weapons (13).
Hence it should be noted that the observed militarization efforts in Armenia raise significant concerns regarding the maintenance of peace and stability within the South Caucasus region, presenting a complex security dynamic. While a state’s right to self-defense is an established principle of international law, the increase in Armenia’s military capabilities naturally raises security concerns among neighboring states, particularly Azerbaijan. This apprehension is further amplified by the historical context of the conflict between the two nations and the fact that until 2020, 20% of Azerbaijani territories were under Armenian occupation.
The absence of a comprehensive peace treaty due to the Yerevan’s deconstructive negotiating stance, sporadic border provocation triggered by Armenia and the resurgence of revanchist nationalism within Armenia, significantly amplifies these concerns. The lack of progress towards a lasting peace, coupled with Armenia’s rapid military buildup, fuels a sense of insecurity in the region. Such a policy not only can cause corresponding reactions from Azerbaijan, leading to an arms race, but also exacerbates the “security dilemma” in the South Caucasus, where each state’s efforts to enhance its security inadvertently undermine the security of others, creating a vicious cycle of mistrust and escalation.
Furthermore, increased military assistance to Armenia from Western powers could exacerbate regional geopolitical tensions by drawing Armenia further into the existing competition between the United States, France, Russia, and Iran. The impact of such a scenario on the South Caucasus, a region which can be regarded as a geopolitical shatter belt in Eurasia could be detrimental to both Armenia and regional stability. By pivoting towards the west and distancing itself from Russia, Armenia, which previously prioritized policy of bandwagoning with Russia, now seems to balance against it. This shift signifies a departure from Armenia’s traditional reliance on Russia for security and reflects a search for alternative security partners and arrangements, potentially further endangering the regional geopolitical landscape and increasing the complexity of regional security dynamics.
In the end, security in the region remains fragile even though new hopes emerged on the horizon after last year when it was announced by the leaders of both Azerbaijan and Armenia that 90 percent of the peace treaty was complete. The growing militarization of Armenia instigates arms race by prompting Azerbaijan to increase its defense budget and arms acquisitions. This dynamic is driven by Azerbaijan’s legitimate security concerns, given Armenia’s territorial claims and the resurgence of revanchist sentiment within the country. In this context, Azerbaijan perceives a heightened security threat, necessitating a corresponding increase in its military capabilities. This situation exemplifies Chekhov’s principle of dramatic necessity, wherein the presence of a weapon, even without immediate intent for use, creates an atmosphere of insecurity since its eventual use is possible. Consequently, this arms race exacerbates the security dilemma in the region, further eroding trust and increasing the risk of escalation. Furthermore, Yerevan’s ongoing militarization casts a significant shadow over its stated commitment to achieving a lasting peace with Azerbaijan, as the pursuit of an arms buildup fundamentally contradicts the spirit of constructive dialogue and undermines peace process. Therefore, Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Jeyhun Bayramov has recently reiterated that Armenia’s large-scale armament amid the negotiation process raises serious concerns (4).
References
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- https://www.state.gov/office-of-the-spokesperson/releases/2025/01/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-armenian-foreign-minister-ararat-mirzoyan-at-a-strategic-partnership-commission-charter-signing-ceremony
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