The Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) issued a response to the article “Azerbaijan’s ‘Neither War Nor Peace’ Strategy Is Limiting Rapprochement with Armenia,” authored by Bashir Kitachayev and published on the official website of the Carnegie Endowment’s Center for Russia and Eurasia on January 7, 2025.

The response reads:

“Unfortunately, it is not the first time the Carnegie has promoted a one-sided view of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, whether during the period of active conflict or in the context of the current peace process. The Carnegie’s ideological rigidity has impeded a balanced assessment of developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In the article by Bashir Kitachaev, which examines Azerbaijan’s post-conflict approach and argues that Baku has deliberately adopted an intermediate position by formally promoting a peace agenda while simultaneously sustaining narratives of hostility. According to this reading, such an approach allows the Azerbaijani leadership to benefit from stability and international legitimacy without engaging in deeper reconciliation that could potentially weaken internal political cohesion. Peace, in this interpretation, is therefore presented not as a terminal objective, but as a managed condition that coexists with the continued construction of an external adversary.

The article argues that Azerbaijan’s post-conflict strategy is ambiguous. In other words, while Azerbaijan officially promotes a peace agenda, it maintains hostile narratives regarding Armenia for domestic political purposes. Peace, in this interpretation, is therefore presented not as a terminal objective, but as a managed condition that coexists with the continued construction of an external adversary.

It is evident that this interpretation relies on a selective analysis of events and overlooks the legal, historical, and structural factors that have shaped both the past Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the current peace process.

Armenian forces occupied roughly 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory and displaced more than 700,000 people. Despite repeated demands by international institutions, including binding UN Security Council resolutions, calling for the withdrawal of occupying forces, the situation remained unchanged for nearly three decades.

The conflict was also marked by episodes of ethnically targeted mass violence against Azerbaijani civilians, including in Khojaly, Aghdaban, and Bashlibel, which continue to shape collective memory and societal perceptions.

The article neglects the anti-Azerbaijani sentiment present in Armenian political rhetoric, public discourse, educational materials, and social media, indicating that the author adopts an asymmetrical perspective.

In a subsequent section, the article suggests that references by Azerbaijani officials to “historical Azerbaijani territories” imply ongoing territorial claims against Armenia. However, Azerbaijan’s official position, repeatedly articulated by President Ilham Aliyev, has been that the conflict is over and that Baku does not maintain territorial claims against Armenia.

In contrast, the Armenian Constitution and other legal and normative documents include explicit territorial claims against Azerbaijan, representing one of the primary obstacles to achieving a stable and lasting peace between the two countries.

At the same time, a core concern for Azerbaijan remains the fate of more than 250,000 Azerbaijanis who were forcibly deported from the Armenian SSR between 1988 and 1992.

Despite having been the party subjected to occupation for many years, it was Azerbaijan that initiated the peace process after the Second Karabakh War by proposing five peace principles fully consistent with international law.

The year 2025 marked a series of milestone developments in the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, creating a realistic foundation for long-term stability in the South Caucasus.

As emphasized in the Washington Declaration, the transition from negotiated texts to a durable peace requires further practical steps leading to the signing and ratification of the agreement. From Baku’s perspective, achieving sustainable peace necessitates addressing the institutional remnants of the past conflict, an approach reflected in Azerbaijan’s call for constitutional amendments in Armenia that would eliminate references implying territorial claims.

In practical terms, Azerbaijan has authorized the transit of Kazakhstani and Russian grain through its territory to Armenia, an arrangement that did not exist during the three decades of conflict. In a further unprecedented step, Baku recently facilitated the delivery of petroleum products to Armenia via Georgia, signaling a readiness to advance normalization through concrete, confidence-enhancing actions.

However, certain think tanks, such as the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Center, continue to approach Azerbaijan’s post-conflict policies with skepticism, often relying on selective, asymmetrical, and biased analyses. They also disregard calls for substantive dialogue and decline to respond to appeals from the AIR Center.”