On 10 July 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Abu Dhabi to further longstanding peace talks after an end to almost three decades of conflict. Following the previous meeting at the European Political Community summit in Tirana just a few weeks previously, this top-level meeting is an incremental but significant step towards institutionalizing post-war diplomacy between the two South Caucasus neighbors. The two capitals’ official statements characterized the talks as “constructive” with an emphasis on a legal and technical platform to maintain a durable peace agreement. Border demarcation and humanitarian issues were discussed, though no specific agreements or new measures were publicly announced.
Nevertheless, there was some positive dynamic as well. Among the most significant results of the session was the acknowledgment between the two nations of the need to codify reciprocal delimitation and demarcation practices. Politically sensitive, yet pragmatically essential, this action signals a step forward toward resolving one of the region’s most contentious sources of tension: fuzzy borders and unguarded crossings. This development also reflects a changing tendency toward institutionalizing post-conflict arrangements through legal and technical processes.
Simultaneously, the normalization process represents a shift away from personality-based diplomacy and toward institutionalized channels. After decades of uncertainty and militarized confrontation, the re-engagement with legal-technical dialogue indicates that Baku and Yerevan are investing in conflict transformation rather than short-term de-escalation. Some important issues such as building mutual trust, reconciling differing legal interpretations, and ensuring reciprocity in the implementation of future agreements have the crucial importance in this stage. These matters, though often framed in technical terms, continue to reflect broader political sensitivities that are not easily resolved through procedural mechanisms alone. Notably, recent formats of negotiation have increasingly proceeded without direct mediation by third-party actors, signaling a cautious shift toward localized ownership of the normalization agenda.
This legalist approach, importantly, does not diminish the emotional and symbolic stakes of the conflict, but channels them into institutional design. Armenia and Azerbaijan are both now appearing to move towards an acceptable format to both sides where peace does not imply political capitulation. Instead, it is presented as a managed, codified outcome of sovereign negotiations, one founded upon international practice and mutual commitment. Here, the South Caucasus is seeking not only peace but a peace under law.
Sensitive Issues and Regional Transport Politics. Legal Harmonization and Structural Obstacles
Simultaneously, the summit fell short of producing breakthroughs on some root differences. Lacking explicitly from the final declarations was any specific mention of the Zangezur corridor, a politically sensitive term in Armenia, particularly concerning the Syunik province. Although Azerbaijan continues to maintain the pivotal importance of regional transport connections, including for its Nakhchivan exclave, both sides appeared to go out of their way to avoid inflammatory rhetoric in favor of general commitments to regional integration.
The meticulous legal framing of the peace process is not accidental, but it reflects a common understanding that lasting peace cannot be founded on political goodwill but must be grounded in binding institutional arrangements. Both sides are taking a step from soft commitments to hard structures by emphasizing delimitation, demarcation, and constitutional guarantees. This is not a procedural requirement but an exercise in trust-building. Legal agreements, consequently, fulfill a number of purposes such as assisting in the depersonalization of the dispute, reducing the space for populist backlash and enabling both parties to make concessions within a rules-based system. In this sense, the legal turn in South Caucasus diplomacy mirrors a deeper recalibration of conflict resolution, in which sovereignty, law, and peace are being re-negotiated simultaneously.
The post-2020 realities for Azerbaijan, as it were, included freed Azerbaijani territories with international law assured status. Baku insists that these constitutional facts are enshrined in an agreement to provide for unimpeded passage through the territory, ideally in the shape of internationally mediated assurances or mechanisms. Armenia, for its part, has underlined the importance of ensuring that regional transportation and transit arrangements align with its constitutional framework. Yerevan has expressed the view that any corridor should operate within the scope of Armenian legislation and administrative oversight.
This divergence in legal positions highlights a deeper challenge in post-war diplomacy: reconciling constitutional sovereignties with regional integration ambitions. While both Baku and Yerevan agree on the strategic value of reopening transit routes, the tools and terms for implementation remain contested. Azerbaijan’s push for binding guarantees and streamlined passage contrasts with Armenia’s emphasis on full administrative control. The diplomatic path forward will likely depend on creative mechanisms that preserve national sovereignty while creating shared legal instruments, such as third-party monitoring, dual customs mechanisms, or supranational adjudication bodies. Without resolving these legal mismatches, no corridor will be sustainable.
The different legal positions of Azerbaijan and Armenia indicate a complex diplomatic situation characterized by interpretations of constitutionality and questions of sovereignty. While Azerbaijan highlights the importance of safe and efficient transit to Nakhchivan as part of regional integration, Armenia continues to emphasize the importance of exclusive legal and administrative authority in its internationally recognized borders. Both have attempted, in the main, to avoid inflammatory rhetoric and instead support regional economic collaboration in principle, if not models.
Against this backdrop, legal tools have become newly prominent not as naked procedural devices but as stabilizing influences in a highly politicized environment. Technical border demarcation and transport regulation commissions are forums for structured debate, wherein the two countries may settle their differences in a less human-focused manner. More than to proclaim an accomplishment, these forums contribute to the moderation of expectations and building process-oriented climate for incremental achievement. Possible solutions are phased implementation of transit facilities on agreed terms and supported by modest third-party monitoring or technical aid where necessary. In spite of the difficulties, in particular reconciling national legal orders with regional ambitions, the emphasis placed on law-led solutions reflects a shared perception that predictability, transparency, and institutional endurance are required for durable peace.
Geopolitical Stakes and Long-Term Vision
The fact that the summit was hosted in Abu Dhabi also deserves mention. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) membership was procedural, its participation reflects an evolving geopolitical dynamic where rising actors, outside classic OSCE, EU, or Russian-led frameworks, are playing facilitating roles. However, the responsibilities of peace remain foremost with Baku and Yerevan.
For Azerbaijan, gaining transit routes through Armenian territory is not only a matter of accessing Nakhchivan as it is, but also a matter of restructuring Azerbaijan’s linkages to Turkey, Central Asia, and the rest of the world. This would allow Baku to diversify its dependence on Iranian transport corridors and expand its logistical footprint across Eurasia. For Armenia, stakes of ending isolation are also at issue. The government in Yerevan must balance internal politics with making sure that any peace settlement doesn’t undermine its domestic legal system. With nationalist and diaspora voter bases firmly in the control of powerful politicians, the government of Prime Minister Pashinyan needs to guarantee ironclad security guarantees and make sure sovereignty, especially in the Syunik province, isn’t diluted. That’s why, constitutional harmonization has been demanded as a non-negotiable element of any final deal.
The appearance of new middleman like the UAE represents a new order where middle powers are actively involved in previously Russia- or Western-dominated domains. Middleman of this type, along with the accompanying capital and neutrality, is capable of serving as good mediator without baggage. In the case of the South Caucasus region, this diversifies diplomatic engagement and offers avenues for investment in infrastructure and energy diplomacy. Armenia and Azerbaijan ensure their peacebuilding within international law and the international markets by putting local arrangements inside transregional configurations such as the North-South Transport Corridor or the EU Global Gateway. To this end, corridor diplomacy is as much a logistical process as it is a geopolitical watershed, connecting local reconciliation to international supply chain stability.
Corridor as a Tool for Peace
Opening transit corridors like the Zangezur Corridor would be a breakthrough achievement, not only for both countries but also the entire region. Unblocking regional transport links can “considerably simplify international trade via reducing transit costs and travel time.” Moreover, it would help Armenia “attract investments to construct transport infrastructure” and enhance its security and economic resilience. For Azerbaijan, the corridor would, finally, reconnect the Nakhchivan exclave with the main Azerbaijan landmass.
Furthermore, establishing these corridors would integrate the South Caucasus into global supply chains. The region can become an active logistics hub-attracting Central Asian trade, outside investment, and geopolitical spotlight by connecting Europe and Asia better. Surely, reopening transport routes would make future conflict less likely because both sides would depend on each other economically. Overall, the corridor is not just infrastructure, it is an agent of peace, cooperation, and regional prosperity. If Azerbaijan and Armenia are willing to adopt a corridor system that weighs legal protections, mutual monitoring, and openness, the South Caucasus can be transformed from a shattered frontier into a corridor of connectivity, progress, and common security.
The proposed corridors, particularly through southern Armenia, also have the potential to remake the region’s economic geography. Investment in infrastructure has the multiplier effect of creating local employment, raising connectivity, and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Trade corridors can bring economic spillovers even to conflict-risk areas, as World Bank models have shown, if there are regulatory protection and security guarantees. Both states can depoliticize the infrastructure while still projecting national interest by institutionalizing transit governance through bilateral agreements or multilateral agreements,
Such corridor-based integration also holds enormous potential for civil society. As borders transform from militarized fault lines to commercial lifelines, potential increases for people-to-people contact, academic exchange, and cross-border dialogue. It allows for a paradigm shift where conflict memory is reconfigured through development cooperation. The creation of such a peace corridor, governed by legal treaties and supported by international actors, would have repercussions far beyond the South Caucasus, establishing a precedent for the settlement of other “frozen” conflicts worldwide.
Conclusion: From Conflict to Contractual Peace
What emerges from the July 10 summit is neither a failure nor a breakthrough, rather, a measured exercise in procedural diplomacy. The two governments no longer are issuing ultimatums, but rather are negotiating to binding legal documents that may govern everything from border crossings to economic transit. This transition from battlefield dynamics to rule-of-law arrangements is a step toward a more stable regional architecture.
As the peace process matures, however, attention has to shift away from declarations toward binding agreements. The South Caucasus requires a contractual peace: one rooted in bilateral treaties and regional charters. This would involve not only harmonization of domestic legislations but also ratification of international agreements on cross-border trade and prevention of conflict. In that context, the July 10 summit has to be understood as a continuation of a longer journey, incremental but cumulative steps toward peace’s legal architecture.
Importantly, moving from “conflict management” to “conflict transformation” requires an essential mind-set shift in institutions. The region needs a new peace environment. This requires sustained global attention, candid discussion, and above all, a shared belief that peace is not only possible but attainable. Lastly, peace in the South Caucasus can’t be declared; it has to be built. The July 10 negotiations are a case in point: without ever making a grand announcement, the simple fact that there are structured, high-level negotiations that signalize a change of tone and strategy. The journey is far from over, but the contours of a new South Caucasus are beginning to take shape, not on the battlefields of war, but in the pages of treaty.
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